
Networking Attacks





Ben Zhao Oct 24, 2018 CS 232/332


Inserting Resource Records into DNS


- Example: you just created company "FooBar"
- You get a block of IP addresses from your ISP
 - say 212.44.9.128/25
- Register foobar.com at registrar (e.g., Go Daddy)
 - Provide registrar with names and IP addresses of your authoritative name server(s)
 - Registrar inserts RR pairs into the .com TLD server:
 - (foobar.com, dns1.foobar.com, NS)
 - (dns1.foobar.com, 212.44.9.129, A)
- Store resource records in your server dns1.foobar.com
 - e.g., type A record for www.foobar.com
 - e.g., type MX record for foobar.com

















The Tour Continues...

• IP Addressing and Allocation

• DNS

• IP Routing


• Transport layer (TCP, congestion control)

Addressing, Forwarding, Routing

- Addressing: we covered already
- Forwarding: Local router process determines output link (a.k.a "next hop") for each packet
 - read address from packet's network layer header
 - search forwarding table
- Routing: Network-wide process that determines the content of forwarding tables
 - \rightarrow determines the end-to-end path for each destination

Routing

- Goal: determine "good" path through network from source to destination
- Network modeled as a graph
 - Routers \rightarrow nodes, Link \rightarrow edges
 - Edge cost: delay, congestion level,.
 - A node knows only its neighbors and the cost to reach them



• How does each node learns how to reach every other node along the shortest path?

Intra-AS & Inter-AS Routing

Intra-AS: routing within a single AS Trusted domain (within one company) Limited scale (<100,000 nodes) Typically using *Link State* protocol (e.g. OSPF)


Inter-AS: routing between AS's Privacy between providers Policy-driven routing BGP, a Path Vector protocol Variant of Distance Vector routing

Intra-AS & Inter-AS Routing


- Intra-AS: routing within a single AS
 - Trusted domain (within one company)
 - Limited scale (<100,000 nodes)
 - Typically using *Link State* protocol (e.g. OSPF)
- Inter-AS: routing between AS's
 - Privacy between providers
 - Policy-driven routing
 - BGP, a *Path Vector* protocol
 - Variant of *Distance Vector* routing

Link State: Control Traffic

- Each node floods its local information to every other node in network
- Each node ends up knowing entire network topology
 → use Dijkstra to compute shortest path to every other node




Link State: Node State




Distance Vector: Control Traffic

- When the routing table of a node changes, it sends table to neighbors
 - A node updates its table with information received from neighbors



Example: Distance Vector Algorithm



Node A

Dest.	Cost	NextHop
В	2	В
С	7	С
D	∞	-

Node B

Dest.	Cost	NextHop
А	2	А
С	1	С
D	3	D

1 Initialization:

- 2 for all neighbors V do
- 3 **if** *V* adjacent to *A*

4
$$D(A, V) = c(A, V);$$

5 **else**

6
$$D(A, V) = \infty;$$


Node (2
--------	---

Dest.	Cost	NextHop
А	7	А
В	1	В
D	1	D

Node D

Dest.	Cost	NextHop
А	8	-
В	3	В
С	1	С

Example: 1^{st} Iteration (C \rightarrow A)



Node A

Dest.	Cost	NextHop
В	2	В
С	7	С
D	ø	-

Node B

Dest.	Cost	NextHop
А	2	А
С	1	С
D	3	D

... 7 **loop:**

...

- 12 else if (update D(V, Y) received from V)
- 13 for all destinations Y do
- 14 **if** (destination *Y* through *V*)
- 15 D(A,Y) = D(A,V) + D(V, Y);

16 **else**

D(A, V) + D(V, Y));

- 18 if (there is a new minimum for dest. Y)
- 19 send D(A, Y) to all neighbors

20 forever


(D(C,A), D(C,B), D(C,D))

Node CDest.CostNextHopA7AB1BD1D


Node D

Dest.	Cost	NextHop
А	8	-
В	3	В
С	1	С

Example: 1^{st} Iteration (C \rightarrow A)



Example: 1^{st} Iteration (C \rightarrow A)



L		_
Cost	NextHop	
2	В	
7	С	
8	С	
	Cost	CostNextHop2B7C

Node B

Dest.	Cost	NextHop
Α	2	А
С	1	С
D	3	D

... 7 **loop:**

...

- 12 **else if** (update D(V, Y) received from V)
- 13 for all destinations Y do
- 14 **if** (destination *Y* through *V*)
- 15 D(A,Y) = D(A,V) + D(V, Y);

16 **else**

17
$$D(A, Y) = min(D(A, Y))$$

D(A, V) + D(V, Y));

- 18 if (there is a new minimum for dest. Y)
- 19 send D(A, Y) to all neighbors

20 forever


Node C

Dest.	Cost	NextHop
А	7	А
В	1	В
D	1	D

Node D

Dest.	Cost	NextHop		
А	8	-		
В	3	В		
С	1	С		

Example: 1st Iteration ($B \rightarrow A$, $C \rightarrow A$)



Node C

- 12 else if (update D(V, Y) received from V)
- 13 **for all** destinations Y **do**
- 14 **if** (destination *Y* through *V*)
- 15 D(A,Y) = D(A,V) + D(V,Y);
- 16 else
- 17 D(A, Y) = min(D(A, Y),D(A, V) + D(V, Y));
- 18 if (there is a new minimum for dest. Y)
- 19 **send** D(A, Y) to all neighbors


20 forever

Dest.	Cost	NextHop					
А	7	А					
В	1	В					
D	1	D					


Node D

Dest.	Cost	NextHop	
А	8	-	
В	3	В	
С	1	С	

Example: End of 1st Iteration




Example: End of 3nd Iteration



BGP: a Path-Vector Protocol

- An AS-path: sequence of AS's a route traverses
- Used for loop detection and to apply policy
- Default choice: route with fewest # of AS's



The Tour Continues...

• IP Addressing and Allocation

• DNS

• IP Routing

• Transport layer (TCP, congestion control)

TCP (Transmission Control Protocol)

- Multiplexes between services
- Multi-packet connections
- Handles loss, duplication, & out-of-order delivery

 all received data ACKnowledged
- Flow control
 - sender doesn't overwhelm recipient
- Congestion control
 - sender doesn't overwhelm network

TCP header




TCP connections

Setup: 3-way handshake

- Explicit connection setup & teardown
- Explicit control flags (e.g., SYN, ACK, FIN, RST)
- Sequence numbers

 reliability & ordering



Let's Talk About Attacks...

Network threat model

- Network scanning
- Attacks on confidentiality (e.g., eavesdropping)
- Attacks on integrity (e.g., spoofing, packet injection)
- Attacks on availability (e.g., denial of service (DoS))
 - Resource exhaustion (e.g., CPU, memory, B/W)
 - Easy to perform, very difficult to defend

Network Scanning: Ping

- Essential, low-level network utility
- Sends a "ping" ICMP message to a host on the internet

```
$ ping 66.66.0.255
PING 66.66.0.255 (66.66.0.255) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 66.66.0.255: icmp_seq=1 ttl=58 time=41.2 ms
```

- Destination host is supposed to respond with a "pong"
 - Indicating that it can receive packets
- By default, ping messages are 56 bytes long (+ some header bytes)
 - Maximum size 65535 bytes
- What if you send a ping that is >65535 bytes long?

Ping of Death

• \$ ping -s 65535 66.66.0.255

- Attack identified in 1997

- IPv6 version identified/fixed in 2013

Windows

An error has occurred. To continue:

Press Enter to return to Windows, or

Press CTRL+ALT+DEL to restart your computer. If you do this, you will lose any unsaved information in all open applications.

Error: OE : 016F : BFF9B3D4

Press any key to continue _

Network Scanning: Traceroute

traceroute — hops between me and host

- Sends repeated ICMP reqs w/ increasing TTL

```
thor Wed Oct 24(12:51am) [~]:-> traceroute www.slack.com
traceroute to www.slack.com (52.85.115.213), 64 hops max, 52 byte packets
1 v11router (128.135.11.1) 1.265 ms 0.788 ms 0.778 ms
  a06-021-100-to-d19-07-200.p2p.uchicago.net (10.5.1.186) 1.292 ms 0.749 ms 0.833 ms
 2
 3 d19-07-200-to-h01-391-300.p2p.uchicago.net (10.5.1.46) 2.124 ms 2.435 ms 2.072 ms
 4 192.170.192.34 (192.170.192.34) 0.755 ms
   192.170.192.32 (192.170.192.32) 0.810 ms 0.701 ms
 5 192.170.192.36 (192.170.192.36) 0.887 ms 0.918 ms 0.877 ms
  r-equinix-isp-ae2-2213.wiscnet.net (216.56.50.45) 1.625 ms 1.803 ms 1.866 ms
 6
   * * *
 7
 8
    * * *
 9
    * * *
10 * * *
11
  178.236.3.103 (178.236.3.103) 4.516 ms 4.326 ms 4.320 ms
12
   * * *
13 * * *
14 * * *
   server-52-85-115-213.ind6.r.cloudfront.net (52.85.115.213) 4.554 ms 4.398 ms 4.757 ms
15
thor Wed Oct 24(12:52am)[~]:->
```

Port Scanning

What services are running on a server? Nmap

linux3 Wed Oct 24(12:54am)[~]:-> nmap www.cs.uchicago.edu
Starting Nmap 7.01 (https://nmap.org) at 2018-10-24 00:55 CDT
Nmap scan report for www.cs.uchicago.edu (34.203.108.171)
Host is up (0.019s latency).
Other addresses for www.cs.uchicago.edu (not scanned): 54.164.17.80 54.85.61.218
rDNS record for 34.203.108.171: ec2-34-203-108-171.compute-1.amazonaws.com
Not shown: 998 filtered ports
PORT STATE SERVICE
80/tcp open http
443/tcp open https
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 4.99 seconds
linux3 Wed Oct 24(12:55am)[~]:->

• 5 seconds to scan a single machine!!

Port Scanning on Steroids **Zmap**


- How do you speed up scans for all IPv4?
 - Don't wait for responses; pipeline
 - Parallelize: divide & conquer IPv4 ranges
 - Randomize permutations w/o collisions
- Result: the zmap tool
 - Scan all of IPv4 in 45mins (w/ GigE cxn)
 - IPv4 in 5 mins w/ 10GigE

SYN scan

Only send SYN

Responses:

- SYN-ACK port open
- RST port closed
- Nothing filtered (e.g., firewall)



Eavesdropping


Tools: Wireshark, tcpdump, Bro, ...


Steps:


- 1. Parse data link layer frames
- 2. Identify network flows
- 3. Reconstruct IP packet fragments
- 4. Reconstruct TCP connections
- 5. Parse app protocol messages

Wireshark, Detailed Protocol Analyzer

app-nortor	n-update2.pcap	ng [Wireshark 1.10.0 (SVN	l Rev 49790 from /trunk-1.10)			
<u>File Edit V</u>	<u>File E</u> dit <u>V</u> iew <u>G</u> o <u>C</u> apture <u>A</u> nalyze <u>S</u> tatistics Telephony <u>T</u> ools <u>I</u> nternals <u>H</u> elp					
001	📕 🔬 🛛 E	B 🗋 🗙 🔍 🔶	🁒 🥥 7 🕹 🔲			🖸 🎬 🗹 🥵 🔆 💢
Filter:			• E	xpression	Clear	Apply Save BadTCP
No. Time		Source	Destination		Length	
5201 52075003		24.4.97.251	68.87.76.178	DNS	76	Standard query 0x6bc0 A www.symantec.com
		68.87.76.178	24.4.97.251	DNS	262	Standard query response 0x6bc0 CNAME www.symantec.d4p.net CNAME s
PERS STREET, N		24.4.97.251	68.87.76.178	DNS	93	Standard query 0xcdc6 A liveupdate.symantecliveupdate.com
		68.87.76.178	24.4.97.251	DNS	286	Standard query response 0xcdc6 CNAME liveupdate.symantec.d4p.net
		24.4.97.251	80.231.19.118	ТСР	62	trim > http [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1
		80.231.19.118	24.4.97.251	ТСР	62	http > trim [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=5840 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PE
1 2000 Factoria		24.4.97.251	80.231.19.118	TCP	54	trim > http [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=65535 Len=0
124		24.4.97.251	80.231.19.118	HTTP	307	GET /minitri.flg HTTP/1.1
1 B		80.231.19.118	24.4.97.251	TCP	60	http > trim [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=254 Win=6432 Len=0
		80.231.19.118	24.4.97.251	HTTP	288	HTTP/1.1 304 Not Modified
CARLES THE CONTRACTOR OF		24.4.97.251	80.231.19.118	TCP	54	trim > http [ACK] Seq=254 Ack=235 Win=65301 Len=0
		24.4.97.251	80.231.19.118	HTTP	298	GET /automatic\$20liveupdate_3.0.0.171_english_livetri.zip HTTP/1.1
12 1 20	0.0012538	RU 221 10 118	<u>2/ / 07 251</u>	нттр	536	HTTD/1 1 ANA Not Found (text/html)
Enamo	5 · 62 h	tor on wino (A		oc cont	÷	(406 bits) on intenface 0
						(496 bits) on interface 0 Dst: Cadant_22:a5:82 (00:01:5c:22:a5:82)
						51), Dst: 80.231.19.118 (80.231.19.118)
		trim (1137)	I, SPC POPL: UPI	II (1137), US	t Port: http (80), Seq: 0, Len: 0
Services and an Area	Contraction of the second s					
	ination p	port: http (80)				*
*					III	
0000 00	0 01 5c 2	2 a5 82 00 17	31 e0 d3 f7 08	00 45 0	0.	\" 1E.
0010 00) 30 Oa 3	3 40 00 80 06	12 39 18 04 61	fb 50 e	.7	0.309a.P.
			21 3b 00 00 00		. 2	v.q.P !;p.
0030 ff	r ff 82 0	08 00 00 02 04	05 b4 01 01 04	02		······
						CHAPPELLUNIVERSITY
🔵 💅 File: "C	:\Users\Laura\[Documents\2010 - Wires	Packets: 149 · Displayed: 149	(100.0%) · Le	ad time:	0:00.235 Profile: Default








Active Attacks

Active Attacks: Blind Spoofing




RST Hijacking

Mallory Server src: Alice's IP RST, seq=y, port=p If Mallory knows y, she has 1/2³² chance of guessing p & closing connection \rightarrow flood with RSTs

TCP Reset attacks used widely for censorship, e.g. Great Firewall

Alice

DNS Cache Poisoning



DNS Cache Poisoning (cont.)

