11. Authentication Part 3 & Access Control



Blase Ur and David Cash February 4th, 2022 CMSC 23200 / 33250



User-Centered Security

Some Ways to Understand Users

- Retrospective analysis of user-created password breaches
- Large-scale online studies
- Examine real passwords with permission
- Qualitative studies

How Do We Help Users Make Better Passwords?

Problem 1: Bad Advice

Carnegie Mellon University

Password Requirements

Must Contain

- At least 8-characters.
- At least one uppercase alphabetic character (e.g., A-Z).
- At least one lowercase alphabetic character (e.g., a-z).
- At least one number (e.g., 0-9).
- At least one special character (e.g., []~!@#\$%^&*()?<>./_-+=).

Cannot Contain

- Known information (i.e., first name, last name, Andrew userID, date of birth, 9-digit Carnegie Mellon ID number, SSN, job title).
- Four or more occurrences of the same character (e.g., aaaa, 2222, a123a345a678a).*
- A word that is found in a standard dictionary.* (after removing non-alpha characters).

*This requirement does not apply to Andrew account passwords that are more than 19 characters in length (e.g., passphrase).

Additional Policies

- Last five passwords cannot be used.
- · Cannot be changed more than four times in a day.

Problem 2: Inaccurate Feedback



Password1!



Problem 3: Unhelpful Feedback



Proactive Strength Checking

• Initial idea: provide feedback

SI

• In practice: complexities regarding what to model, and how to do so efficiently

Password Strength Fair	
Password strength: Strong	- Weak
rong	Weak
	✓ Password could be more secure.

Meters' Security & Usability Impact



Blase Ur, Patrick Gage Kelley, Saranga Komanduri, Joel Lee, Michael Maass, Michelle Mazurek, Timothy Passaro, Richard Shay, Timothy Vidas, Lujo Bauer, Nicolas Christin, Lorrie Faith Cranor. How Does Your Password Measure Up? The Effect of Strength Meters on Password Creation. In *Proc. USENIX Security Symposium*, 2012.

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Meters Are Ubiquitous



Test Meters' Impact

- How do meters impact password security?
- How do meters impact usability?
 - Memorability
 - User sentiment
 - Timing
- What meter features matter?
- 2,931-participant online study

Baseline Password Meter



Create a password

Account Password

1

A strong password helps prevent unauthorized access to your email account.

Type new password:	
	8-character minimum; case sensitive
Password strength:	Bad. Consider adding an uppercase letter or making your password longer.
Retype new password:	
	Make my password expire every 72 days.
	Save

Visual Differences

Type new password:

Baseline meter

and a	
usenIX	

8-character minimum; case sensitive

Fair. Consider adding a digit or making your password longer.

Three-segment	Fair. Consider adding a digit or making your password longer.
Green	Fair. Consider adding a digit or making your password longer.
Tiny	Fair. Consider adding a digit or making your password longer.
Huge	Fair. Consider adding a digit or making your password longer.
No suggestions	Fair.
Text-only	Fair. Consider adding a digit or making your password longer.

Visual Differences

Type new password:

Baseline meter

usenIX

8-character minimum; case sensitive

Fair. Consider adding a digit or making your password longer.

Three-segment	Fair. Consider adding a digit or making your password longer.	-
Green	Fair. Consider adding a digit or making your password longer.	R
Tiny	Fair. Consider adding a digit or making your password longer.	90
Huge	Fair. Consider adding a digit or making your password longer.	
No suggestions	Fair.	
Text-only	Fair. Consider adding a digit or making your password longer.	14

Scoring Differences

usenIX\$e5 Type new password: 8-character minimum; case sensitive Excellent! **Baseline meter** Poor. Consider adding a different symbol or making your password longer. Half-score Bad. Consider adding a different symbol or making your password longer. One-third-score Poor. Consider making your password longer. Nudge-16 Excellent! Nudge-Comp8

Key Results

- Stringent meters with visual bars increased resistance to guessing
- Visual differences did not significantly impact resistance to guessing
- No significant impact on memorability

Authentication in Practice: Moving Towards A Passwordless World?

Case Study: WebAuthn

FIDO2 BRINGS SIMPLER, STRONGER **AUTHENTICATION TO WEB BROWSERS**



FIDO AUTHENTICATION: THE NEW GOLD STANDARD



Protects against phishing, man-in-the-middle and attacks using stolen credentials



Log in with a single gesture - HASSLE FREE!



services

Case Study: WebAuthn

- Created under the FIDO2 project, now a W3C standard
- Goal: Authenticate on web using public-key crypto
- Implemented in specialized hardware OR in software using a TPM/TEE



Case Study: WebAuthn

User interaction: Push a button on a key, type a PIN into the device, present biometric (fingerprint) to hardware reader





Authentication in Practice: Password Add-Ons / Alternatives

Single Sign-On

Login with Facebook

OpenID[®]



Single Sign-On: Shibboleth



Diagram from <u>https://docs.shib.ncsu.edu/docs/shibworks.html</u> For a good (long) explanation, see: <u>https://www.switch.ch/aai/demo/</u>

Two-Factor Auth







Choose an authentication method		
ACME	Duo Push RECOMMENDED	Send Me a Push
	ලිමි Call Me	Call Me
<u>What is this?</u> 다 <u>Need help?</u>	Passcode	Enter a Passcode
Powered by Duo Security		

Physical Tokens / Smart Cards

- Codes based on a cryptographic key
 Token manufacturer also knows the key
- What if there is a breach?





Authentication in Practice: I Forgot My Password

Resetting Accounts

- I forgot my password!
- Send an email?
- Security questions?
- In-person verification?
- Other steps?
- (No backup)

Authentication in Practice: Password Managers

Password Managers

- Trust all passwords to a single master password (still a good idea in most cases)
 - Also trust software
 - Centralized vs. decentralized architectures







Authentication in Practice: Password Reuse 🛞

Password Reuse-Based Attacks



Maximilian Golla, Miranda Wei, Juliette Hainline, Lydia Filipe, Markus Dürmuth, Elissa Redmiles, Blase Ur. "What was that site doing with my Facebook Password?" Designing Password-Reuse Notifications. In *Proc. CCS*, 2018.

People Reuse Passwords





Memory-Hard Hash Function **Rate-Limiting Guessing** Email Argon2i Hash of Password I'm not a robot ••• ••• reCAPTCHA \$argon2i\$v=19\$m=4096,... jim@mail.com Privacy - Terms ••• ••• Password Strength Meter Your password could be better. Username Consider inserting digits into <u>(Why?)</u> the middle, not just at the end Password Make your password longer <u>(Why?)</u> acmccs18 than 8 characters <u>(Why?)</u> Consider using 1 or more Show Password & Detailed Feedback @ symbols A better choice: \a#D18cmccs How to make strong passwords



Email

...

jim@mail.com

...

Linked in

Email

jane@aol.com

jessey@gmx.net

jenny@gmail.com

jim@mail.com

john@hotmail.com

. . .

Linked in

Email

SHA-1 Hash of Password

7c4a8d09ca3762af61e595209

5baa61e4c9b93f3f0682250b6

7c222fb2927d828af22f59213

ba93664a90285b9ff18a7a081

jane@aol.com

jessey@gmx.net

jenny@gmail.com

jim@mail.com

. . .

john@hotmail.com b1b3773a05c0ed0176787a4f1

Crack All The Things!



\$> hashcat -m 100 -a0 \$TARGET \$DICT
123456
Password
R0cky!17
Football!17
CanadaRocks!

Linked in

Email	Cracked SHA-1 Hashes	
jane@aol.com	123456	
jessey@gmx.net	5baa61e4c9b93f3f0682250b6	
jenny@gmail.com	Canada4ever	
jim@mail.com	R0cky!17	
john@hotmail.com	HikingGuy89	

Dead On Arrival





1 guess is enough!

Linked in

Email	Cracked SHA-1 Hashes
jane@aol.com	123456
jessey@gmx.net	5baa61e4c9b93f3f068225 0b6
jenny@gmail.com	Canada4ever
jim@mail.com	R0cky!17
john@hotmail.com	HikingGuy89

Monitoring the Black Market





Facebook buys black market passwords to keep your account safe

The company's security chief says account safety is about more than just building secure software.

BY KATIE COLLINS | NOVEMBER 9, 2016 12:56 PM PST



Password-Reuse Notifications



Authentication in Practice: Checking for Compromised Credentials

Checking for Compromised Credentials

'; Home Notify me Domain search Who's been pwned Passwords API About Donate	09:41 √ ♀
	Back Security Recommendations
':have i been pwned?	Detect Compromised Passwords
Check if your email address is in a data breach	iPhone can securely monitor your passwords and alert you if they appear in known data leaks. HIGH PRIORITY
email address pwned?	1? This password has appeared in a data leak, which puts this account at high risk of compromise. You should change your password immediately.
Firefox Monitor Home Breaches Security Tips	Change Password on Website
	Password Manager
See if you've been part of an online data breach.	
Find out what hackers already know about you. Learn how to stay a step ahead of them.	Password Checkup
Enter Email Address	Check the strength and security of your saved passwords. Find out if they've been compromised and get personalized advice when you need it.
Stay safe: Get email alerts when your info appears in a known breach	Sign in
Check for Breaches	

https://www.zdnet.com/article/google-launches-password-checkup-feature-will-add-it-to-chrome-later-this-year/ https://ios.gadgethacks.com/how-to/ios-14-monitors-your-passwords-protect-you-against-data-breaches-heres-works-0341281/

Checking for Compromised Credentials

Under the hood:

How Password Checkup helps keep your accounts safe



https://security.googleblog.com/2019/02/protect-your-accounts-from-data.html

What about Biometrics?



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Images fair use from fbi.gov, ifsecglobal.com, and siemens.com

Biometrics

- Fingerprint
- Iris scans or retina scans
- Face recognition
- Finger/hand geometry
- Voice or speech recognition
- The way you type
- (Many others)

Practical Challenges for Biometrics

- Immutable (can't be changed)
- Potentially sensitive data
- High equipment costs
- Sensitive to changes in the environment
- Biometrics can change over time

Storing Biometrics: Templates













•Images fair use from androidcentral.com, creativebits.org, and businessinsider.com.

Smartphone Biometrics

- Purpose is to reduce the number of times a user must enter their password
- Falls back to the password
- Face recognition can be tricked by a photo
- Fingerprint recognition can be tricked by a gummy mold
- Users find fingerprint unlock convenient, but do not particularly like face unlock

Authentication Conclusions

- Authentication is really hard!
 - Hard for system administrators
 Hard for users
- Unfortunately, authentication is necessary

Access Control

Access Control: Basic Instantiation

- File permissions on UNIX:
 - Owner, Group, Others
- Useful commands
 - chown (change owner of a file)
 - chown blase:plantnerds rareplants.txt
 - chmod (**ch**ange **mod**es of a file)
 - chmod g+w rareplants.txt (user group others, add + or remove -, read write execute)
 - chmod 750 rareplants.txt (additive: 0 = nothing, 1 = execute, 2 = write, 4 = read)

Access Control

- Role-based access control
 - Authorization based on role (e.g., "UChicago student")
- Attribute-based access control
 - Authorization based on attribute(s) (e.g., "Over 7 feet tall")
- Context-based access control
 - Authorization decision depends on the context (e.g., time of day)