

# 19. Network Attacks I

Blase Ur and David Cash

(some slides borrowed from Ben Zhao, Christo Wilson, & others)

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CMSC 23200 / 33250



THE UNIVERSITY OF  
CHICAGO

# Network threat model

- Network scanning
- Attacks on confidentiality  
(e.g., eavesdropping, side channel information)
- Attacks on integrity  
(e.g., spoofing, packet injection)
- Attacks on availability  
(e.g., denial of service, or **DoS**)

# Scanning and observing networks

# Network Scanning: Ping

- Essential, low-level network utility
- Sends a “ping” ICMP message to a host on the internet

```
$ ping 66.66.0.255
PING 66.66.0.255 (66.66.0.255) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 66.66.0.255: icmp_seq=1 ttl=58 time=41.2 ms
```

- Destination host is supposed to respond with a “pong”
  - Indicating that it can receive packets
- By default, ping messages are 56 bytes long (+ some header bytes)
  - Maximum size 65535 bytes
- What if you send a ping that is >65535 bytes long?

# Ping of Death

- \$ ping -s 65535 66.66.0.255
  - Attack identified in 1997
  - IPv6 version identified/fixed in 2013

Windows

An error has occurred. To continue:

Press Enter to return to Windows, or

Press CTRL+ALT+DEL to restart your computer. If you do this, you will lose any unsaved information in all open applications.

Error: 0E : 016F : BFF9B3D4

Press any key to continue \_

# Network Scanning: Traceroute

- traceroute — hops between me and host
  - Sends repeated ICMP reqs w/ increasing TTL

```
thor Wed Oct 24(12:51am)[~]:-> traceroute www.slack.com
traceroute to www.slack.com (52.85.115.213), 64 hops max, 52 byte packets
 1  vllrouter (128.135.11.1)  1.265 ms  0.788 ms  0.778 ms
 2  a06-021-100-to-d19-07-200.p2p.uchicago.net (10.5.1.186)  1.292 ms  0.749 ms  0.833 ms
 3  d19-07-200-to-h01-391-300.p2p.uchicago.net (10.5.1.46)  2.124 ms  2.435 ms  2.072 ms
 4  192.170.192.34 (192.170.192.34)  0.755 ms
    192.170.192.32 (192.170.192.32)  0.810 ms  0.701 ms
 5  192.170.192.36 (192.170.192.36)  0.887 ms  0.918 ms  0.877 ms
 6  r-equinix-isp-ae2-2213.wiscnet.net (216.56.50.45)  1.625 ms  1.803 ms  1.866 ms
 7  * * *
 8  * * *
 9  * * *
10  * * *
11  178.236.3.103 (178.236.3.103)  4.516 ms  4.326 ms  4.320 ms
12  * * *
13  * * *
14  * * *
15  server-52-85-115-213.ind6.r.cloudfront.net (52.85.115.213)  4.554 ms  4.398 ms  4.757 ms
thor Wed Oct 24(12:52am)[~]:->
```

# Port Scanning

- What services are running on a server? Nmap

```
linux3 Wed Oct 24(12:54am)[~]:-> nmap www.cs.uchicago.edu

Starting Nmap 7.01 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2018-10-24 00:55 CDT
Nmap scan report for www.cs.uchicago.edu (34.203.108.171)
Host is up (0.019s latency).
Other addresses for www.cs.uchicago.edu (not scanned): 54.164.17.80 54.85.61.218
rDNS record for 34.203.108.171: ec2-34-203-108-171.compute-1.amazonaws.com
Not shown: 998 filtered ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE
80/tcp    open  http
443/tcp    open  https

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 4.99 seconds
linux3 Wed Oct 24(12:55am)[~]:-> █
```

- 5 seconds to scan a single machine!!

# SYN scan

Only send SYN

Responses:

- SYN-ACK — port open
- RST — port closed
- Nothing — filtered (e.g., firewall)



# Port Scanning on Steroids



- How do you speed up scans for all IPv4?
  - Don't wait for responses; pipeline
  - Parallelize: divide & conquer IPv4 ranges
  - Randomize permutations w/o collisions
- Result: the zmap tool
  - Scan all of IPv4 in 45mins (gigabit connection)
  - IPv4 in 5 mins (10 gigabit connection)

# Eavesdropping

Tools: Wireshark, tcpdump, Zeek (Bro), ...

Steps:

1. Parse data link layer frames
2. Identify network flows
3. Reconstruct IP packet fragments
4. Reconstruct TCP connections
5. Parse app protocol messages

# Wireshark, Detailed Protocol Analyzer

app-norton-update2.pcapng [Wireshark 1.10.0 (SVN Rev 49790 from /trunk-1.10)]

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Tools Internals Help

Filter: Expression... Clear Apply Save BadTCP

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	0.00000000	24.4.97.251	68.87.76.178	DNS	76	Standard query 0x6bc0 A www.symantec.com
2	0.011505000	68.87.76.178	24.4.97.251	DNS	262	Standard query response 0x6bc0 CNAME www.symantec.d4p.net CNAME s
3	0.275559000	24.4.97.251	68.87.76.178	DNS	93	Standard query 0xcdc6 A liveupdate.symantecliveupdate.com
4	0.291867000	68.87.76.178	24.4.97.251	DNS	286	Standard query response 0xcdc6 CNAME liveupdate.symantec.d4p.net
5	0.336805000	24.4.97.251	80.231.19.118	TCP	62	trim > http [SYN] Seq=0 win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1
6	0.508336000	80.231.19.118	24.4.97.251	TCP	62	http > trim [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=5840 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PE
7	0.508459000	24.4.97.251	80.231.19.118	TCP	54	trim > http [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=65535 Len=0
8	0.508953000	24.4.97.251	80.231.19.118	HTTP	307	GET /minitri.flg HTTP/1.1
9	0.686341000	80.231.19.118	24.4.97.251	TCP	60	http > trim [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=254 win=6432 Len=0
10	0.686838000	80.231.19.118	24.4.97.251	HTTP	288	HTTP/1.1 304 Not Modified
11	0.843702000	24.4.97.251	80.231.19.118	TCP	54	trim > http [ACK] Seq=254 Ack=235 win=65301 Len=0
12	1.635308000	24.4.97.251	80.231.19.118	HTTP	298	GET /automatic\$20liveupdate_3.0.0.171_english_livetri.zip HTTP/1.1
13	1.808631000	80.231.19.118	24.4.97.251	HTTP	536	HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found (text/html)

Frame 5: 62 bytes on wire (496 bits), 62 bytes captured (496 bits) on  
Ethernet II, Src: AsustekC\_e0:d3:f7 (00:17:31:e0:d3:f7), Dst: Cadant...  
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 24.4.97.251 (24.4.97.251), Dst: 80.2...  
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: trim (1137), Dst Port: http  
Source port: trim (1137)  
Destination port: http (80)  
Stream index: 01

```
0000 00 01 5c 22 a5 82 00 17 31 e0 d3 f7 08 00 45 00  ..\".... 1....
0010 00 30 0a 33 40 00 80 06 12 39 18 04 61 fb 50 e7  .0.3@... .9..a
0020 13 76 04 71 00 50 fc be 21 3b 00 00 00 00 70 02  .v.q.P. !;...
0030 ff ff 82 08 00 00 02 04 05 b4 01 01 04 02  .....
```



Side channels

# Overview

- Transport Layer Security (TLS) enables secure communication
- Frequently encountered with web browsing (HTTPS) and more behind the scenes in app, VOIP, etc.

# What Does HTTPS Hide? (Ghost)

- Body of the HTTP request / response is hidden
- ...So what's left to be seen / inferred?

# Side Channels

- Using metadata or outside observations to make inferences about the data



# Web Side Channels Include:

- Size of packets
  - How can this reveal what pages you are visiting?
- Timing

## Remote Timing Attacks are Practical

David Brumley  
*Stanford University*  
dbrumley@cs.stanford.edu

Dan Boneh  
*Stanford University*  
dabo@cs.stanford.edu

### Abstract

Timing attacks are usually used to attack weak computing devices such as smartcards. We show that timing attacks apply to general software systems. Specifically, we devise a timing attack against OpenSSL. Our experiments show that we can extract private keys from an OpenSSL-based web server running on a machine in the local network. Our results demonstrate that timing attacks against network servers are practical and therefore security systems should be designed against them.

The attacking machine and the server were in different buildings with three routers and multiple switches between them. With this setup we were able to extract the SSL private key from common SSL applications such as a web server (Apache+mod\_SSL) and a SSL-tunnel.

**Interprocess.** We successfully mounted the attack between two processes running on the same machine. A hosting center that hosts two domains on the same machine might give management access to the admins of each domain. Since both domains are located on the same machine, one admin could use




# Web Side Channels Include:

- Color
  - [link one](#)
  - [second link](#)
  - [link three \(visited\)](#)
  - [fourth link](#)

# Protocol attacks

# Active Attacks: Blind Spoofing




# RST Hijacking

Mallory

Server

Alice

src: Alice's IP  
RST, seq=y, port=p




TCP Reset attacks used widely for censorship, e.g. Great Firewall (for selective blocking)

# Inter-domain routing (BGP) attacks and large-scale observation

# Recall: BGP (Path-Vector Protocol)

- An AS-path: sequence of AS's a route traverses
- Used for loop detection and to apply policy



# BGP Prefix Hijacking

- Advertise a more desirable route even if the route isn't actually more desirable, or even real
- Goal 1: Route traffic through networks you control so that you can observe the traffic
- Goal 2: Send lots of traffic to someone you don't like (denial of service)



## **Corrigendum- Most Urgent**

**GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN**  
**PAKISTAN TELECOMMUNICATION AUTHORITY**  
**ZONAL OFFICE PESHAWAR**

Plot-11, Sector A-3, Phase-V, Hayatabad, Peshawar.

Ph: 091-9217279- 5829177 Fax: 091-9217254

www.pta.gov.pk

NWFP-33-16 (BW)/06/PTA

February ,2008

Subject: **Blocking of Offensive Website**

Reference: *This office letter of even number dated 22.02.2008.*

I am directed to request all ISPs to immediately block access to the following website

URL: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o3s8jtvvg00>

IPs: 208.65.153.238, 208.65.153.253, 208.65.153.251

Compliance report should reach this office through return fax or at email [peshawar@pta.gov.pk](mailto:peshawar@pta.gov.pk) today please.

**Deputy Director**  
(Enforcement)

To:

1. M/s Comsats, Peshawar.
2. M/s GOL Internet Services, Peshawar.
3. M/s Cyber Internet, Peshawar.
4. M/s Cybersoft Technologies, Islamabad.
5. M/s Paknet, Limited, Islamabad
6. M/s Dancom, Peshawar.
7. M/s Supernet, Peshawar.



# BGP Prefix Hijacking

4/25/2019  
02:30 PM



Marc Laliberte  
Commentary

Connect Directly



0 COMMENTS

[COMMENT NOW](#)

[Login](#)



100%



0%

## How a Nigerian ISP Accidentally Hijacked the Internet

**For 74 minutes, traffic destined for Google and Cloudflare services was routed through Russia and into the largest system of censorship in the world, China's Great Firewall.**

On November 12, 2018, a small ISP in Nigeria made a mistake while updating its network infrastructure that highlights a critical flaw in the fabric of the Internet. The mistake effectively brought down Google — one of the largest tech companies in the world — for 74 minutes.

To understand what happened, we need to cover the basics of how Internet routing works. When I type, for example, HypotheticalDomain.com into my browser and hit enter, my computer creates a web request and sends it to HypotheticalDomain.com servers. These servers likely reside in a different state or country than I do. Therefore, my Internet service provider (ISP) must determine how to route my web browser's request to the server across the Internet. To maintain their routing tables, ISPs and Internet backbone companies use a protocol called Border Gateway Protocol (BGP).

<https://www.darkreading.com/cloud/how-a-nigerian-isp-accidentally-hijacked-the-internet/a/d-id/1334482>



Hotmail

YAHOO!

Google



YouTube



# (TS//SI//NF) FAA702 Operations

*Two Types of Collection*



## Upstream

- Collection of communications on fiber cables and infrastructure as data flows past.  
(FAIRVIEW, STORMBREW, BLARNEY, OAKSTAR)

**You  
Should  
Use Both**

## PRISM

- Collection directly from the servers of these U.S. Service Providers: Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, PalTalk, AOL, Skype, YouTube, Apple.

From Snowden archives, dated April 2013






# (TS//SI//NF) PRISM Collection Details



## Current Providers

- Microsoft (Hotmail, etc.)
- Google
- Yahoo!
- Facebook
- PalTalk
- YouTube
- Skype
- AOL
- Apple



## What Will You Receive in Collection (Surveillance and Stored Comms)?

It varies by provider. In general:


- E-mail
- Chat – video, voice
- Videos
- Photos
- Stored data
- VoIP
- File transfers
- Video Conferencing
- Notifications of target activity – logins, etc.
- Online Social Networking details
- **Special Requests**

Complete list and details on PRISM web page:

Go PRISMFAA



# (TS//SI//NF) Dates When PRISM Collection Began For Each Provider



**PRISM Program Cost:  
~\$20M per year**

# S-BGP / BGPsec

IP prefix announcements signed

Routes signed

— previous hop authorizes next hop

Higher levels vouch for lower levels

— e.g., ICANN vouches for ARIN, ARIN vouches for AT&T, ...

Problem?

Costly and slow adoption

# HTTP Session Hijacking

# Firesheep (now discontinued)

- On shared networks (e.g., wifi), the Firesheep browser extension would sniff session cookies sent unencrypted (over HTTP)

